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NOTES AND COMMENT
effect as long as it remains 26peaceful and becomes unlawful as soon
as it turns towards violence.
The author does not condemn combinations which have as
their objective interference with the free flow of labor, but he does
feel that before such interference is allowed the equities of the
parties should be carefully weighed, the sanctity of the contract on
the one hand, and the social and economic advantages to be gained
on the other.
PHILIP ADELMAN.

LIABILITY OF A LANDLORD FOR NEGLIGENTLY MAKING REPAIRS
WHEN NOT OBLIGATED TO Do So.

In a recent New York case 1 the Court of Appeals laid down a
doctrine for determining the liability of a landlord for damage resulting from gratuitous repairs. The facts in that case, as related to this
discussion, were briefly these: The plaintiff, a tenant in the premises
of the defendant Chapman, had entered into a lease exempting the
latter "from all liability to the former for any injury to person or
property * * *, whether the said damage or injury shall be caused by
or be due to the negligence of the landlord, the landlord's agent,
servant, employee or not." 2 Thereafter the roof began to leak and,
at the request of the tenant, the landlord sent men down who repaired
the roof and departed. They told the tenant that these repairs were
not permanent, and would not prevent the roof from leaking. The
roof leaked again and the landlord's agents again came to the premises, this time disclosing to the tenant the condition of the roof which
permitted the leaking. They also made some temporary repairs, and
again departed after repeating the statements they had made the first
time. Upon an examination it was revealed that the same condition
still existed after their departure. Thereafter, great quantities of
water leaked in, which damaged the goods of the tenant, who thereupon brought this action. The Court of Appeals, in dismissing the
plaintiff's complaint, predicated its decision on this formula:
The landlord in a gratuitous undertaking is liable for damage to
the tenant if he misrepresents the nature and extent of the repairs
' National Protective Association v. Cunming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369
(1902)
Typothetae v. Typographical Union No. 6, 132 App. Div. 921, 117
N. Y. Supp. 70 (1st Dept. 1909), aff'd without opinion, 196 N. Y. 571, 90 N. E.

1161 (1909) ; Albro J. Newton Co. v. Erickson, 70 Misc. 291, 126 N. Y. Supp.
949, aff'd without opinion, 144 App. Div. 939, 129 N. Y. Supp. 1111 (2nd
Dept. 1911).
'Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 258 N. Y. 489, 180

N. E.
2 245 (1932).
Id. at 493.
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and damage ensues, "or creates insecurity where formerly there was
safety." 3
In other words, a landlord's liability for gratuitous repairs is
limited to two instances: when he misrepresents the efficacy of the
repairs, by word or act; or creates a new danger. This rule is supported by judicial opinion and legal principle, and dispels the uncertainty concerning the negligence necessary to hold the landlord liable.
As to misrepresentation, or "negligence in word," 4 as it is sometimes called, there never seemed to be a doubt. This is justly so, for
if the landlord asserts that he has repaired a certain condition, and it
is safe, whereas a danger still exists which is now hidden or camouflaged, he should be liable.
The conflict, however, arises as to the second ruling. The case
of Thorn v. Deas 5 was the first important judicial gesture in creating
the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance in gratuitous
undertaking. It was said, then, that although one is not liable for
not acting under a contract without consideration, he "is responsible
when he attempts to do it, and does it amiss." 6
Wynne v. Haight 7 was the next landmark on this question.
There the defendant, who was under no duty to repair, attempted to
fix the ceiling in his tenant's apartment. Subsequently the ceiling
fell, and the tenant sought to hold the landlord for liability for negligently making the repairs. The Court in holding for the defendant,
distinguished between negligence as it is ordinarily used, and the
negligence necessary to predicate liability on in this type of case,
saying that to recover the plaintiff must show affirmative acts of
negligence on the part of the landlord. The landlord's liability
accrues if his act is the real, direct cause of the accident, and merely
showing inefficient or incomplete repairs is insufficient.
Tiffany, in writing on this proposition, distinctly affirmed that
ruling, citing Wynne v. Haight in support of his statement.8 Professor Bohlen, an authority on the law of torts, indorses this view.9
There is a consistent line of cases following Wynne v. Haight,
which conclusively laid down the same rule. In Salveta v. Farley,10
the Court cited the Wynne case, quoting the following words from
it: "his negligent act must be the real cause of the injury, and it is
at 496.
Glanzer v. Shephard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922) ; International

3Id.

Products Co. v. Erie R. Co., 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662 (1927).
54 Johns. 84 (N. Y. 1809).
6 Id. at 96.
'27 App. Div. 7, 50 N. Y. Supp. 187 (1st Dept. 1898).
STIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910) §87, subd. f. 3: "If the repairs
made by the landlord are merely insufficient, that is, if the pre-existing defects
and dangers still exist, in spite of the landlord's action in setting about their
repair, he should not, it seems, be liable by reason of such action."
'BoLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS, p. 206.
" 123 N. Y. Supp. 230 (App. T. 1st Dept. 1910).
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for that alone that he12is liable." 11 The same theory was followed in
Lipshitz v. Rapaport.
Another important and much-cited case on the same proposition
followed. In Marston v. Frisbie,13 where the insufficient repairs of
a loose step were involved, the Court, presenting the theory on which
the landlord could be held, said: "having volunteered to repair, he
was negligent with respect to the repairs he attempted to make, and
increased the danger, and that the damages were the direct results
of his acts." 14
Schatzky v. Harber affirmed the same ruling in even stronger
language, the Court there stating: "the fact that he volunteered to
make the temporary repair did not impose upon him the obligation of
making it reasonably safe, for being under no duty to repair he
should not be held liable merely for having attempted to repair if the
floor was not rendered more unsafe by what he did, or the plaintiff
was not misled thereby." 15
This strong statement was affirmed and cited with approval in
Botwin v. Rothkopf 16 and in Jarchin v. Rubin 17 where the facts
showed an attempted repair, and the same condition continuing to
exist.
Thus the judicial trend of thought, as indicated by these cases,
seemed definitely to be towards imposing liabilify on the landlord only
for his active, direct negligence. It had to be proved that he created
the danger, or magnified the existent condition before he was held
liable. Merely commencing repairs and failing to complete them, or
entering to make repairs, and leaving the premises in no worse condition, was no basis for a tort liability.
8
However, in the case of Marks v. Nambil,1
Judge Cardozo,
writing for the Court, expressly attempted to overrule the holding of
the Wynne case, and the Marston case, as before stated. In the
Marston case, where the landlord had told the tenant that the repairs
would "last forever," 19 the Court rightly held the landlord liable for
subsequent damage. It was not necessary for the decision that any
reference at all be made to the theory advanced in the Wynne case,
and those following it, for a clear-cut case of misrepresentation
existed. The landlord had expressly told the tenant, in as many
words, that the repairs were complete, and the danger removed. The
Court seemed to base its opinion on that, or, at least, increasing the
danger, for it stated: "the inference is permissible that the presence
of the prop cloaked the defect, dulled the call to vigilance, and so
11

Ibid.
133 N. Y. Supp. 385 (App. T. 1st Dept. 1912).

168 App. Div. 666, 154 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1st Dept. 1915).
"Id. at 370.
Shatzky v. Harber, 164 N. Y. Supp. 610, 611 (App. T. 1st Dept. 1917).
"0217
N. Y. Supp. 192 (App. T. 2d Dept. 1926).
218 N. Y. Supp. 269 (App. T. 2d Dept. 1926).
18245 N. Y. 256, 157 N. E. 129 (1927).
"Id. at 258.
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aggravated the danger." 20 In the face of this, the statement of
Judge Cardozo, in the same case, "that it is sufficient if what was
wrong continues to be wrong" seems to be merely dicta and should
be treated as such.
This stand becomes even stronger when the case of H. R. Moch
Co., Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co.21 is read. In that case there was
an agreement between the city of Rensselaer and the defendant,
whereby the defendant agreed to furnish water to the city for fire
hydrants and other purposes. A fire arose and plaintiff's warehouse
was damaged, which he claims could have been prevented if a sufficient amount of pressure for drawing water had existed in the fire
hydrant. Judge Cardozo, writing the opinion for the Court, in discussing the question of negligence, said: "what we are dealing with
at this time, is a mere negligent omission, unaccompanied by malice
or other aggravating elements. The failure in such circumstances to
furnish an adequate supply of water is at most the denial of a
benefit. It is not the commission of a wrong." 22
It is well to note that the defendant furnished some water; thus
the liability, if any, for negligence would be for not proceeding to
complete what had already been started. This is in conflict with the
statement in the Marks case and seems to recognize it as merely dicta,
and therefore ignores it. The cases thus seem to be reconciled on
that basis.
The rule as expressed in the Kirshenbaum case can be reconciled
on the principles of the law of negligence. Negligence has been
defined as the breach of a legal duty, proximately resulting in damage. That is, damage in order to be compensable must
have resulted
from the dangerous condition as a proximate cause. 23
The proximate cause of an accident is the cause without which
the accident could not have occurred. 24 It is the efficient cause, the
one that necessarily set the other causes in motion.2 5
Examining the rule we can see that it comes squarely within this
theory of proximate cause. It cannot be said that the proximate cause
of an accident resulting after gratuitous repairs, is the failure to
completely repair. The condition which caused the accident was that
which existed before the landlord even put his hand to the repairs;
and would have caused the damage, as it did, even if the landlord had
not entered. Having entered, it would be anomalous to say that the
scope of proximate cause would be enlarged to include an omission
to complete that which he was under no duty to perform. Where he
has commenced repairs and enhanced the danger, it can readily be
seen that his act is the proximate cause of any damage which results.
=oId. at 259.
=247 N. Y. 160, 159 N. E. 896 (1928).
Id. at 169.
'Hall v. N. Y. Telephone Co., 214 N. Y. 49, 108 N. E. 182 (1915) ; Babcock v. Fitzpatrick, 221 App. Div. 225, 225 N. Y. Supp. 30 (3rd Dept. 1927).
4
" WORDS AND PHRASES,

'

p.

5762.
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His has been the last act which increased the danger and he is responsible for any injury resulting therefrom. This does not rest on the
theory of a duty to complete, but on the obligation not to create a
danger which had heretofore not existed.
A fortiori the argument becomes the stronger if in repairing he
creates a danger in some part of the premises distinct from the one
he is repairing. Thus his liability is for active, creative acts of negligence and not merely for passive omission to completely remove
defects.
To summarize, the rule that a landlord who gratuitously repairs
premises is liable for damage only if he has misrepresented the condition of the repairs, or has created a new danger, or enlarged an old,
seems amply supported by judicial opinion and legal principle 26 and
is a just and fair one.
IRVING L. WHARTON.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS.

That the law is a living organism capable of adaptation to the
ever-increasing complexities of the modern social and political system
is well illustrated in the development of that branch of jurisprudence
that is termed administrative law.
Administrative tribunals are public officers and commissions
which in addition to their primary executive or delegated legislative
power, have incidental judicial power, that is, power to hear and
determine causes. Administrative law embraces the principles applied by the courts in reviewing the determinations of these tribunals.
Fundamental in administrative law is the principle that the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal not being at issue or having been
established, an appellate court will not interfere with the action of
that tribunal unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. If the
administrative tribunal has jurisdiction, and has a reason for its determination, the appellate court will look no further; it will not substitute its judgment for that of the tribunal.' "Power to make the
2

" AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEmENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS

§232:

"A lessor of land, who by purporting to make repairs thereon while the land is
in the possession of his lessee or by the negligent manner in which he has made
such repairs has, as the lessee neither knows nor should know, made the land
more dangerous for use, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused thereby
to the lessee and others upon the land in the right of the lessee."
Hilton v. Merritt, 110 U. S. 97, 3 Sup. Ct. 548 (1888); Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349 (1903) ; U. S. v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S.
253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644 (1905) ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 215 U. S. 452, 30 Sup. Ct. 155 (1909) ; People ex reL. New York
& Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345, 38 Sup. Ct. 122, aff'g, 219 N. Y.
84, 113 N. E. 795 (1916); People ex rel. Schwab v. Grant, 126 N. Y. 473,
27 N. E. 964 (1891); Matter of Ormsby v. Bell, 218 N. Y. 212, 112 N. E. 747
(1916) ; People ex rel. Board of Education v. Graves, 243 N. Y. 204, 153 N. E.
49 (1926).

